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ABSTRACT
We present a graphic case for unemployment insurance (UI) program reform. Through a series of
illustrations summarizing historical trends, we show how the UI system has diverged from its intended
purposes. Our figures show the decline of the program in addressing its essential aims of paying adequate
unemployment compensation during involuntary unemployment and providing reemployment services.
We illustrate the big differences in UI programs that have emerged because of the broad discretion
afforded states to determine benefit generosity. We also illustrate declines in the financial means for
providing benefits and reemployment services and a widening divergence among states in the quality of
UI programs. Our concluding section presents a list of reforms that would restore UI as a pillar of social
insurance and the labor market.
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The unemployment insurance (UI) program exists to provide temporary income support
to workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own while they are actively searching
for new jobs. As shown below, the UI program is intended to pay adequate weekly UI benefits to
eligible workers for reasonable periods of time. To have sufficient funds to pay for a reasonable
level of benefits, sufficient UI taxes must be paid on a reasonable taxable wage base. However,
over time UI tax rates and taxable wage bases eroded in many states to the point of not being
sufficient to fund adequate UI benefits. Because of insufficient funding, many states have made
it more difficult to apply for and be eligible to receive UI, resulting in a declining percentage of
unemployed workers collecting benefits. Similarly, for unemployed workers who do collect
benefits, they receive lower benefit amounts and for shorter periods of time, despite the
increasing need for benefits as the average duration of unemployment has increased in the United
States.
The decline of the UI system has been uneven across states. Some pay adequate benefits
and collect sufficient taxes to pay for them. In many other states, this has not been the case. In
many states, taxable wages and tax rates have been inadequate for many years. Those states have
responded to insufficient taxation by reducing or not increasing weekly benefit levels, and some
have reduced the duration of benefits.
We have argued elsewhere that it is necessary to reform the UI program and have
presented evidence-based recommendations for reforms (O’Leary and Wandner 2018). This
paper presents more specific evidence showing the need for reform.
Our paper begins with some background about the UI program, including its basic
provisions and how they work. We then examine some factors that demonstrate the need for
reform—economic, demographic, administrative, and legislative. We show the importance of a
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healthy UI program during recessions as well as how the program responded to the Great
Recession. Finally, we illustrate the decline of the UI program in recent decades and the wide
variation in the program among the states, differences so wide as to endanger the integrity of the
program in many states, making it inadequate for a large number of unemployed American
workers.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: THE BASICS
The unemployment insurance program was established under Titles III and IX of the
Social Security Act of 1935. 1 In 1936, employers began paying taxes into state accounts in the
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF), but, to allow the UTF to accumulate reserves, payments of UI
benefits did not begin until 1938.
Administratively, the UI system was established as a federal-state program. The federal
government sets the broad legislative and administrative framework for the 50 states plus the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. States administer their own programs
under conforming state laws that set almost all of the parameters of state UI programs, including
eligibility criteria, benefit amounts and durations, tax levels and taxable wage bases, and the
level and type of reemployment services provided to UI claimants.
Responsibilities for the UI program are divided between Congress, the U.S. Department
of Labor (USDOL), and the states.
•

The federal legislative framework is established by Congress.

•

USDOL determines whether individual state UI programs are in conformity and
compliance with federal law and regulations. USDOL also provides guidance and
direction to state UI agencies for operating and managing their programs.

For a more extensive discussion of the UI program, see O’Leary and Wandner (1997) and
Wandner (2018).
1
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•

Within the federal framework, state UI laws and procedures determine most of the
specifics of the program, e.g., benefit eligibility, levels, and duration, as well as state tax
rates and taxable wage base. As a result, programs vary widely across the country.
The UI program has the twin goals of providing adequate benefits to qualified

unemployed workers and maintaining a robust U.S. economy.
•

The microeconomic goal with respect to individual unemployed workers is to provide
adequate, temporary income support.

•

The macroeconomic goal for the economy as a whole is to exert countercyclical pressure
on the state and U.S. economies by providing income and encouraging consumption
during periods of high unemployment.
The UI system is commonly defined as a social insurance program that pays temporary,

partial wage replacement to experienced covered workers who are unemployed through no fault
of their own and are actively searching for work. Following is an examination of the components
of that defintion and what they mean:
•

Temporary benefits: Benefits for the basic (“regular”) UI program are paid for up to 26
weeks in most states. Since the Great Recession, however, 10 states have reduced benefit
durations below 26 weeks, and there has been other tightening of eligibility and benefit
payment provisions.

•

Partial wage replacement: Benefit amounts are generally set at half of an unemployed
worker’s prior wage up to a maxium amount, generally set by the states once a year.

•

Experienced workers: To be eligible for UI benefits, unemployed workers must have had
recent attachment to the labor force, measured by minimum earnings in a recent fourquarter period, called the “UI base period.”

•

Covered employment: While coverage was limited in 1935, federal law has expanded
coverage, especially in the areas of agricultural, state and local government, nonprofit
employees, and household workers. Today nearly all wage and salary employees are
covered by UI.
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•

No fault unemployment: Qualifying workers have to have been laid off for lack of work.
They cannot have quit their job or been fired for cause. They also cannot be new entrants
to the labor force, and they cannot be reentrants to the labor force unless they were out of
the labor force for a short period and have sufficient recent earnings during their base
period to qualify.

•

Actively searching for work: UI has a work search requirement. UI recipients must
demonstrate that they are able, available, and actively searching for work while receiving
benefits. The work test is generally administered by the state Employment Services
office.

Thus, there are two sets of eligibility requirements to qualify for UI benefits:
•

Monetary eligibility: Workers have to have earned sufficient wages in a recent benefit
year period to be eligible for benefits.

•

Nonmonetary eligibility: Workers have separated from work involuntarily, are searching
for work, and may not refuse suitable work.

Program cyclicality and responsiveness: Looking at the number of individuals receiving UI
and the amount of benefits paid out by the UI program, it is apparent that the UI program is
highly cyclical, meaning that total benefit payments vary greatly between a relatively small
aggregate amount when the economy is doing well and a much higher amount during
recessionary periods (see Table 1). While layoffs occur throughout the business cycle, many
more workers become unemployed during recessions. As a result, the number of unemployed
workers tends to surge at the beginning of a recession and then decline rapidly as the recession
ends. Also, during recessions, UI recipients are much more likely to exhaust their entitlement to
all of their regular UI benefits, up to 26 weeks of benefits in most states.
Extended benefits: Since UI recipients are much more likely to exhaust all of their
entitlement to regular benefits during recessionary periods, many of these workers will be in very
difficult economic straits by the time they exhaust their regular benefits and likely will need
5

more financial assistance before they find work. Over the past five decades, the UI program has
usually provided benefit extensions through two types of programs during recessionary periods:
the permanent Extended Benefits program and temporary emergency benefit programs:
•

Permanent Extended Benefits (EB) program: This program was enacted in 1970. It is a
federally authorized state-by-state program that is “triggered” on and off by state
unemployment rate measures such that it pays additional needed UI benefits when
unemployment increases sharply. However, it was not originally well designed, not paying
benefits during appropriate high-unemployment periods, and the design has not been
improved in the past five decades. As a result, it has not been effective at paying additional
benefits, even during periods of high unemployment.

•

Temporary emergency benefits programs: Temporary programs have been enacted by
Congress in every recession since 1958. Congress responds to constituent complaints about
the inadequacy of regular UI benefits, and this inadequacy is magnified when the permanent
EB program is ineffective in high-unemployment states. The temporary emergency program
has had many names, but in recent recessions it has been named Emergency Unemployment
Compensation (EUC). Legislation enacting temporary emergency programs also have
frequently made temporary changes to the permanent EB program so that it too adds benefit
durations for the long-term unemployed.

FACTORS SUGGESTING THE NEED FOR UI REFORM
There are four broad categories of factors that suggest the need for comprehensive UI
reform. First, Congress has neglected the UI program, failing to update and improve its
legislative framework. The last major reform of the UI program was over four decades ago in
1976 and was not really comprehensive. Congress considered a large number of issues that they
could not agree upon and left a number of controversial issues for a UI study commission
(National Commission on Unemployment Compensation 1980). Later, Congress authorized
another UI study commission, which also made recommendations for program reform (Advisory
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Council on Unemployment Compensation 1996). The reports of these two commissions were
never considered legislatively. Many of the issues considered by the two commissions still need
to be addressed at the federal level (Wandner 2018). By contrast, Congress has enacted many
changes to the provisions of the Social Security old age assistance program, and many advisory
council reports have resulted in legislative updates and improvements to the program (Ball
1985).
Second, the U.S. economy has changed significantly since the 1976 UI legislative
reforms. The industry and occupational mix of employment has changed. During recessions,
employers respond differently than they did before 1976. Layoffs are much more likely to be
permanent, and the durations of unemployment have been increasing. Thus, among the major
changes are the following:
•

A decline in temporary layoffs, an increase in permanent layoffs, and an increase in the
durations of unemployment (Groshen and Potter 2003). All of these factors adversely
affect UI claimants and call for adjustments to the current UI program.

•

A change in the industrial mix of the U.S. economy, reflected in the decline in the goodsproducing sector and replacement with service sector jobs, where service workers are less
likely to collect UI benefits (O’Leary and Wandner 2019), particularly since service
workers are less likely to know about the UI system and how to apply for benefits.
Third, the demographics of the U.S. labor force have changed significantly, but the UI

program has not fully adapted. These changes include:
•

increased female labor force participation,

•

steadily increasing older worker labor force participation since the 1990s,

•

more households with two or more workers, and

•

increase in voluntary part-time employment, fueled in part by the influx of mothers, care
givers, and older workers into the labor force.
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Some of these demographic changes have not been accompanied by UI program changes
to accommodate the new demographic reality.
Fourth, policy decisions and policy failures at the federal and state levels of government
have substantially weakened the UI program over the past four decades:
•

Congress has largely ignored the UI program, as reflected by its lack of enactment of any
major federal legislative reform for over four decades.

•

The leadership and oversight role of the U.S. Department of Labor has weakened, leaving
the states to determine the scope and nature of their state UI programs (Wandner 2019).

•

For many years, state UI laws, programs, and policies have varied and generally
weakened benefit payment and tax collection systems. These changes can be seen in the
figures presented below.
The rest of this paper deals primarily with the results of this fourth issue, the negative

impact of federal and state policy decisions that have weakened the UI program. The main
intervention by the federal government has been to provide longer durations of benefit payments
during recessions. Congress has largely ignored the program during good times and failed to
make needed reforms. Lacking federal guidance or federal mandates, the states have been left on
their own, with many states deciding to sharply curtail their state UI programs. 2
HOW DOES THE UI PROGRAM WORK? LOOKING AT THE NUMBERS BEFORE,
DURING, AND AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION
The following table begins the story of how the UI system works over the business cycle, in this
case before, during, and after the Great Recession, which officially started in December 2007
and ended in June 2009. Looking at select years from 2006 to 2018, the data for these years show
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We have dealt elsewhere with the issues of economic and demographic change of the U.S.
economy (Wandner 2018).
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the status of the UI program before the Great Recession in 2006, during the Great Recession
years of 2008 and 2009, during the “jobless recovery” that extended through 2012, and in the
strong recovery after 2012.
Table 1 Unemployment Insurance First Payments, Exhaustions, and Expenditures,
Selected Fiscal Year
Unemployment rate (%)
Program participants (millions)
First payments
Regular exhaustions*
Payments ($ billions)
Regular benefits
Extended benefits
Emergency benefits**
All program payments***
State tax collections

2006
4.8

2008
5.3

2009
8.6

2010
9.8

2011
9.2

2012
8.2

2015 2018
5.4
4.0

7.4
2.7

8.8
3.1

14.4
6.4

11.3
7.0

9.7
5.1

8.7
4.4

6.6
2.6

5.3
2.0

30.2
0.0
0.0
31.5
35.9

38.1
0.0
3.5
43.1
32.2

75.3
4.1
39.1
119.7
31.1

63.0
8.0
83.8
156.4
38.3

48.5
11.9
54.6
116.8
49.3

44.3
0.2
0.0
90.4
59.4

31.7
0.0
0.0
32.6
42.2

27.6
0.0
0.0
28.3
36.4

NOTE: * = Exhaustees of the regular 26-week UI benefits. ** = Includes temporary federal additional benefits. *** =
Includes benefits under Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees, ex-military, and Trade Adjustment
Assistance.
SOURCES: USDOL (2019); Wandner (2012, p. 8).

Here are some of the things that the table shows:
•

The Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
reveals that the unemployment rate nearly doubled from 2006 to 2010 and then slowly
declined after 2010, falling below the 2006 level in recent years.

•

The number of UI recipients (called “first payments” in the UI system) also nearly
doubled from 2006 to 2009 and began declining in 2010, falling well below the 2006
level in recent years.

•

The number of UI recipients who exhausted their entitlement to regular UI benefits more
than doubled from 2006 to 2010, and then declined below the 2006 level in recent years.

•

While benefit payments for the regular UI program more than doubled from 2006 to
2010, the enormous increase in UI payments during and after the Great Recession was
due to congressional action that altered and made the permanent EB program much more
9

generous and 100 percent federally funded instead of 50-50 sharing with states. Congress
also enacted a EUC program that vastly increased the duration of UI benefits—up to a
total of 99 weeks in some states.
•

While the number of UI recipients only doubled, the total UI payments increased
fivefold.

•

The enormous increase in UI payments was due to the lack of job openings during the
period during and after the Great Recession, which meant that durations of
unemployment increased substantially.

•

Nonetheless, after the jobless recovery period that extended through 2012, job openings
increased, the number of UI recipients declined significantly, and total UI benefit
payments returned to prerecession levels by 2015.
Thus, we can see that the UI program is highly cyclical and highly responsive to distress

in the U.S. economy. The number of people entering the UI program increases rapidly during a
recession, but then declines quickly after the height of a recession. Nonetheless, the need for
additional durations of UI benefits increases during and (frequently) after recessions. The reason
for the need for longer durations of benefits in the period immediately after a recession is that job
openings increase slowly, and many UI recipients experience prolonged periods of
unemployment well after the end of a recession.
WEAKNESSES OF THE UI PROGRAM
The following points prelude our paper by briefly overviewing the series of eleven
figures we present to illustrate the decline in the U.S. UI system.
•

An overall decline in the UI program over time, especially regarding benefit payments
and tax collections. This decline is shown with national time series data.

•

Wide variation in state programs, which continues over time because of lack of federal
standards for UI benefit payments and tax collections. A comparison of state programs
reveals wide differences between states in the adequacy of benefits and collection of
10

taxes. While some states have adequate UI benefit and tax systems, other states avoid
raising tax rates and taxable wage bases by keeping benefit generosity low and making it
more difficult to qualify for benefits.
•

Other graphical presentations show wide difference over time between the needs of the
unemployed and the availability of benefits.
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) of 1939 requires the federal government to

set the FUTA taxable wage base that is used to raise federal UI taxes, which pay for UI and
Employment Service (ES) administration, a portion of the permanent Extended Benefit program,
and loans to states when UI state trust fund accounts go broke.
To pay for regular UI benefits, under federal UI law, states must have a taxable wage
base at least as high as the FUTA wage base. While states can set their taxable wage base higher
than the federal level, many states set their tax base at or not much higher than the FUTA taxable
wage base.
The ability of the UI system to pay adequate UI benefits depends on the two features that
determine how much money the UI system raises: the UI tax rate and the UI taxable wage base.
The fact that both the average state UI tax rate and the taxable wage base are low in many states
makes it likely that UI benefits are inadequate in those states. The fact that the federal taxable
wage base has remained low allows many states to set their own low UI taxable wage bases. 3
Currently, the federal UI taxable wage base is $7,000. It has increased only three times since
1940. By contrast, the Social Security taxable wage base has increased steadily since the 1960s,
first by discretion, then, since 1975, by annual adjustment according to a national wage index
(Whitman and Shoffner 2011). In 2019, the Social Security taxable wage base reached $132,900.

The UI taxable wage base started at total wages and was in effect in 1937 and 1938. In 1939 amendments to Social
Security and UI included a reduction in the UI taxable wage base to $3,000 to make it the same as for Social
Security (Balducchi and O’Leary 2018, p. 94).

3
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About 94 percent of all workers have annual earnings below the Social Security taxable wage
base and about 86 percent of all earnings are below the base (Whitman and Shoffner 2011).
Figure 1
UI and Social Security taxable wage bases and the ratio of total to UI
taxable wages, 1940−2018

$100,000

0.90

(UI taxable wages/total wages)

0.80
0.70

$80,000

0.60
0.50

$60,000

0.40

$40,000

0.30
0.20

$20,000

0.10
0.00

$0
SS-Taxable Wage Base

Ratio of taxable to total wages

Taxable wage base in dollars

$120,000

1.00

UI-Taxable Wage Base

Ratio of taxable to total wages

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, ET Financial Data Handbook 394;
and www.ssa.gov.

While there are policy debates about whether the Social Security taxable wage base is
itself adequate and whether it should be raised further for tax equity and adequacy purposes, it is
clear that higher state taxable wage bases and tax rates are necessary to fund adequate state
benefit programs. The UI federal taxable wage base of $7,000 is completely inadequate.
Examining Figure 1, it is apparent that the current inadequacy of the UI federal tax base has been
caused by congressional neglect. Since FUTA set the taxable wage base at $3,000 effective in
January 1940, the ratio of UI taxable to total wages has gradually declined such that the percent
of total wages that are currently taxable is about 25 percent. Figure 1 shows that, from a public
finance perspective, the federally mandated UI taxable wage base has remained at a very low
level and is insufficient to fund adequate benefits not increasing with wages over time. The
12

relatively static UI taxable wage base can be compared to the Social Security wage base that has
automatically increased annually.
To address the problem of inadequate UI funding, the UI taxable wage base should be
increased substantially and then indexed like the Social Security taxable wage base. While the
federal taxable wage base is used to generate federal UI tax receipts and acts as a floor for state
UI taxable wage bases, states are free to set their own taxable wage base for paying state UI
benefits using a taxable wage base at least equal to or greater than the federal rate.
Given this flexibility, most states have elected to maintain low taxable wage bases that
are not much higher than the federal minimum rate of $7,000.
•

18 states have taxable wage bases of $10,000 or less.

•

14 states have taxable wage bases greater than $25,000.

Figure 2
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The Taxable Wage Base from Highest-to-Lowest of the 50 States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands as of 2019Q3

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Quarterly UI Data Summary.
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Thus, the great majority of states have low and inadequate taxable wage bases, with more
than 40 states having taxable wage bases less than $25,000.
In the post–World War II period, there has been a downward trend in UI taxes as a
percentage of total wages. The decline in financial support for the UI system has inevitably been
accompanied by a downward trend in UI benefits as a percentage of total wages. Figure 3 shows
that, since 1946, there has been a downward trend in UI taxes and benefits as a percentage of
total wages. Both benefits and taxes are less than one percent of total wages. In this graph and in
some of the following graphs, a trend line is fitted to the data in each time series. The tax and
benefit trend lines are both declining and converging. A structural deficit is emerging across the
collection of state UI benefit financing systems, and inadequate financing is putting downward
pressure on UI benefits in many states.
Figure 3
UI Taxes and Benefits as Percentage of Total Wages in the United
States, 1946–2018
0.025

0.020

0.015

0.010

0.005
Taxes
0.000

1946

1954

Benefits
1962

1970

Linear (Taxes)
1978

1986

Linear (Benefits)
1994

2002

2010

2018

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, ET Financial Data Handbook 394.
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Figure 3 also shows that UI benefits are highly procyclical, increasing sharply when the
unemployment rate increases—note the red spikes. Because UI benefits are paid from the
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF), over time UI taxes must replenish the fund. We see, however,
that taxes tend to increase only after a recession, then quickly decline.
The result is inadequate long-term funding for the UI program, and many individual state
accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund go broke in recessions. As a result, because of their
inadequate funding, state UI programs can and do borrow heavily from the Treasury-maintained
Unemployment Trust Fund.
The original expectation for the UI program was that states would build up reserves in
their state UTF accounts during good times, such that they would have adequate funds to pay for
high, recessionary UI benefits during economic downturns. In actuality, few states build up
adequate reserves during good economic times. Many state reserve balances go negative during
recessions, and it often takes several years for states to rebuild reserves.
UI benefits generally are set at 50 percent of the UI recipient’s prior weekly wages up to
a maximum set annually by each state.
Because many states set the benefit maximums at low levels, during most of the post–
World War II period, the nationwide average wage replacement has tended to be approximately
35 percent.
There has been a downward trend in the UI wage replacement rate since the mid-1970s
(Figure 4). In many states the average replacement rate had declined because the state maximum
weekly benefit amount has not been increased for many years (Vroman 2018).
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Figure 4
Regular UI Wage Replacement Rate in the United States, 1938–2018
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, ET Financial Data Handbook 394.

The UI benefit program has been weakening since 1980. It serves a smaller percentage of
the unemployed (the UI recipiency rate), and, for the unemployed workers whom it does serve, it
pays a smaller percentage of the wages that they have lost (the wage replacement rate). Figure 5
shows the downward trend in both the regular UI program recipiency rates and the wage
replacement rates since 1980. Thus:
•

Far fewer unemployed workers have been collecting UI in recent years than in the 1980s:
the recipiency rate measures the percent of the unemployed who receive UI benefits.
Recipiency rates tended to hover around 40 percent until a decade ago; more recently
they have declined to not much above 30 percent.
Unemployed workers who receive UI benefits receive less than half their prior weekly

wages, and they have been receiving a smaller percentage of their prior wages over time (the
wage replacement rate). In the period from 1980 through 1995, wage replacement rates were
16

greater than 35 percent. Over the past three decades, wage replacement rates have been below 35
percent except during recessionary periods.
Figure 5
Regular UI Recipiency and Wage Replacement Rates in the United
States, 1980–2018
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, ET Financial Data Handbook 394
and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, Employment Status of the
Civilian Non-Institutional Population.

While the national UI recipiency rate has been declining, the UI recipiency rate varies
greatly among the states:
•

Nine states have recipiency rates of greater than 40 percent.

•

Twenty-nine states have recipiency rates of less than 25 percent.

•

North Carolina’s recipiency rate is the lowest in the nation at 10.5 percent.

At 51.7 percent, New Jersey’s recipiency rate is nearly five times as big as North Carolina’s.
Figure 6 illustrates this 2018 UI recipiency rates for all states.
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Figure 6
UI Recipiency Rates in the 50 States plus the District of Columbia for
2018
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, ET Financial Data Handbook 394
and U.S. Department of Labor, Current Population Survey, Employment Status of the Civilian Non-Institutional
Population.

Over half of all unemployed workers tend to be on layoff—as opposed to workers
unemployed because of quitting their prior job or being new entrants or reentrants to the labor
force. Since nearly all workers who work in covered employment have substantial attachment to
the workforce, if they are on layoff, then they should be eligible for UI.
If states generally have layoff rates of approximately 50 percent, the 29 states with
recipiency rates of less than 25 percent are serving only a small percent of the potentially eligible
workers on layoff.
For example, if North Carolina—with the nation’s lowest recipiency rate—has a layoff
rate of about 50 percent, then only approximately one in four workers on layoff collect UI.
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The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ unemployment data demonstrate that the layoff rate is
cyclical, but it tends to vary around 50 plus percent. There is a small upward trend in the layoff
rate (Figure 7). Since it is the job of the UI program to provide UI benefits to strongly attached
unemployed workers on layoff, one would expect that the UI recipiency rate also would be
increasing to accommodate the rising layoff rate. However, while the regular UI recipiency rate
also varies with the business cycle, from 1980 to 2018 it has been declining substantially from
approximately 35−40 percent to less than 30 percent.
Figure 7
Regular UI Recipients and Layoffs as a Percent of the Unemployed,
1980–2018
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, ET Financial Data Handbook 394
and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, Employment Status of the
Civilian Non-Institutional Population.

The decline in the UI recipiency rate nationally is determined by individual state UI
programs that make it easier or harder to receive UI benefits. Let’s turn to why recipiency varies
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so much by state. State governments determine UI eligibility conditions, levels of benefits, and
duration of benefits. They also determine how hard or easy it is to apply for and receive benefits.
The making of rules to determine how easy or hard it will be to receive UI benefits is part
of a political process that goes on in each state capital. The major players in determining how
generous UI benefits will be in the state are employer and employee representatives.
Figure 8
Union Membership as a Percentage of Employment by State Ordered by
Lowest-to-Highest Regular UI Recipiency Rate for 2018
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Administration, ET Financial Data Handbook 394 and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local
Area Unemployment Statistics.

Because employers directly pay nearly all UI taxes, state employer organizations try to
keep UI benefits and UI taxes as low as possible. By contrast, state organized labor groups try to
maintain a high level of state UI benefits and to have state UI tax rates and tax bases sufficient to
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UI recipiency rate

25.0

fund state UI benefits. Organized labor in the U.S., however, is weak and has been declining
over time. Nationally, less than 10 percent of wage and salary workers are union members, and
union membership varies greatly by state. Thus, one would expect that there would be a
relationship between the extent of union membership and UI recipiency rates. Figure 8 shows
that indeed there is such a relationship. Since the determination of UI benefit provisions is a
political decision arrived at by state political officials, where unionization is strong, organized
labor appears to have more power to influence state UI policy.
Figure 9
UI Payment Denial Rate for 2018 for the States and Territories
Excluding the Virgin Islands
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Weekly
Claims data; U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, ET Financial Data Handbook
394.

Unemployed workers can apply for UI benefits. Once they submit an initial claim for UI
benefits, those applications are reviewed by state UI staff members. The applications are
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approved or denied, and they can be denied for a variety for reasons. Workers may not have had
enough earnings in their base year, resulting in denials for monetary reasons. Workers also may
be denied because of factors relating to their separations (nonmonetary reasons), such as
misconduct or having quit their job without cause.
The denial rate is the percentage of workers who apply for UI but are denied benefits for
a variety of reasons. The denial rate varies widely between states. It can be an important reason
for differences in recipiency rates between the states (Figure 9).
Figure 10
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Since the early 1970s, most states have set the usual maximum potential duration of
regular UI benefits at 26 weeks, although most states provide maximum potential durations that
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Long-term unemployed percentage

Maximum weeks

Average Potential Weeks Duration of Regular UI Receipt for Workers
Fully Unemployed and the Percentage of Unemployed Who Are Jobless
for 27 Weeks or Longer in the United States, 1971–2018

vary by individual UI beneficiary based on eligibility requirements. Those maximums have been
reduced in some states, especially since the Great Recession.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines long-term unemployment as a duration of 27
weeks or more, so the exhaustion of UI recipients’ potential duration and the BLS measure of
long-term unemployment are closely related.
The goal of the UI program should be to attempt to provide a sufficient number of
potential weeks of UI benefits such that most workers can find new jobs before they exhaust
their entitlement to regular UI benefits. Given that the number of long-term unemployed
workers—workers continuing to remain unemployed after their twenty-sixth week of
unemployment—has been increasing, it would be expected that the potential duration of UI
benefits would have increased over time rather than declining. Instead, as the need for UI
benefits has increased, the availability of weeks of benefits has declined.
As shown in Figure 10, since 1971 states have been reducing the average potential
number of weeks that workers can receive UI benefits. Thus, the application of eligibility
requirements has become more restrictive and results in more workers becoming eligible only for
lower potential durations of benefits.
Low maximum potential durations of benefits lower not only the duration of benefits
received but, if the maximum is low enough, can actually discourage unemployed workers to
apply for UI benefits. Thus, the lower the potential duration of UI benefits, the less likely
unemployed workers will apply for UI benefits. An extreme example of low maximum potential
duration is North Carolina, where in 2018 the potential duration reaches only ten weeks when the
state unemployment rate is low.
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While there are severe problems with the benefit payment and tax collection aspects of
the UI program, UI claimants also face inadequate assistance in helping them finding new jobs,
assistance that is supposed to be provided by the Employment Service in local workforce offices
around the United States.
Figure 11
Wagner-Peyser Funding for Employment Services
in Nominal and Real Dollars (1984 = 100)
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.

Very few unemployed workers are temporarily laid off. Instead, most laid-off workers are
permanently laid off. Since UI recipients generally do not return to their prior jobs, they almost
all need to search for new work.
Traditionally the Employment Service has provided job matching services and job search
training—for example, short training sessions on how to search for work. These services have
been critical to successfully returning UI recipients back to work in a timely fashion. However,
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funding for the Employment Service has been reduced sharply since the mid-1980s in nominal
terms, and the reduction has been especially great in real terms—adjusted for inflation.
What this means to UI recipients is that when they go to a public workforce one-stop
center, they are not likely to receive in-person one-on-one reemployment services. Instead, they
are likely to be sent to a resource room where they are expected to use a personal computer to
search for labor market information, take aptitude and other tests, search for job openings, and
conduct other activities on their own. There may or may not be staff available to help them
navigate the on-line products. They are not likely to get personal assistance in developing a
résumé or learning how to successfully take a job interview.
The result is that the provision of reemployment services is very limited. Technologysavvy, professional workers may do well searching for work on their own. Others—especially
less educated, older, those who speak English as a second language or have a disability, and
others—have a much harder time searching for and finding work.
CONCLUSIONS AND OVERVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The UI program has declined over time for several reasons, including the following: 1)
not adapting to the changing economic characteristics of the U.S economy and the demographic
mix of the labor force, 2) no significant reforms since 1976 and not addressing issues that
Congress anticipated even then but could not agree upon, 3) a federal partner in the UI system
that has not exerted strong leadership, and 4) state UI systems that have eroded over many years
in response to political forces that have mostly reduced the effectiveness of the UI program.
In sum, the UI system has weakened over the past four decades, and it needs substantial
reform in order for it to meet the program goals first established in 1935. To restore social
insurance principles and reemployment incentives, and to accommodate current labor market
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needs, we suggest expansive UI reform. In this paper, we have suggested a number of needed
reforms (also detailed in in O’Leary and Wandner 2018), which we summarize below.
Eligibility
•

Eligibility should be offered to bona fide labor force members involuntarily separated
from work and who are engaged in an active search for reemployment.

•

Labor force attachment (monetary eligibility) should be demonstrated by earnings in the
high quarter base period (the first four quarters of the last five completed calendar
quarters) equal to at least twice the state average weekly wage in UI-covered employment
plus earnings of at least the average weekly wage outside the high quarter base period.

•

For claimants found not monetarily eligible based on the standard base period, all states
should consider earnings in an alternate based period of the four most recently completed
calendar quarters.

•

All states should allow workers to collect UI while seeking part-time work, if their base
period earnings included part-time work.

•

The UI benefit offset for retirement income should be repealed.

•

Refusal of suitable work requirements concerning the reservation wage for reemployment
should specify a schedule for an acceptable wage as a proportion of prior earnings which
declines as the duration of unemployment rises.

•

An active work search is expected of all UI beneficiaries, and efforts by the public
employment service should actively support the search for return to work.

•

Since the FUTA tax supports the Wagner-Peyser public employment service, revenues
from the FUTA tax should be increased and automatically appropriated by Congress
annually to the states.

Benefit Levels and Durations
•

Benefits levels should provide socially adequate income replacement that does not
introduce an excessive disincentive for employment.

•

Benefit durations should accommodate an energetic and exhaustive search for new work
with sufficient reemployment supports.
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•

States should replace 50 percent of prior earnings up to the state maximum weekly
benefit amount.

•

The state maximum weekly benefit amount should be set at two-thirds the state average
wage in UI-covered employment. At least 26 weeks of benefits should be available.

Extended Benefits
•

Revenues from the FUTA tax should pay for 100 percent of extended benefits (EB) for
all states that adequately fund 26 weeks of regular state UI benefits in all economic
periods.

•

The EB trigger should be based simply on state unemployment rate levels, with no
relative measure limiting EB availability. EB should pay up to 26 weeks, with the
understanding that Congress may act on an emergency basis to supplement the permanent
EB program.

Benefit Financing
•

The FUTA taxable wage base should be set to 25 percent of the Social Security taxable
wage base and indexed to change in step with the latter.

•

Employer financing should be limited to the state responsibility for regular benefits, with
the FUTA levy covering the full cost of program administration and extended benefits
during high-unemployment periods.

•

States should hold UI reserves in Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) accounts at the U.S.
Treasury sufficient to pay at least one year of benefits at the average of the three highest
cost rates experienced in the prior 20 years.

•

The U.S. Treasury should pay states with sufficient reserves interest rates at least 25 basis
points higher than the rate charged to states borrowing to pay UI benefits. States with
positive reserve balances should be paid at least the rate charged to borrowing states.

•

Nonprofit employers should be required to pay FUTA taxes to fund program
administration and employment services.

Administrative Financing
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•

Congress should annually appropriate adequate funds for UI administration from the
employment security administrative account in the UTF, or Congress should change this
mechanism to an automatic funding formula based on state share of FUTA contributions.

•

Funding for the Wagner-Peyser public employment service should be restored to the
1984 level in real terms and indexed to the Social Security taxable wage base.

Employment Service and Reemployment Services
•

Effective mechanisms for forward funding of state benefits and an emphasis on
reemployment of beneficiaries are essential features.

•

The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system should be fully
funded.

•

The Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment and Reemployment Services (RESEA)
program should pay for the work test and services to WPRS-profiled and referred UI
beneficiaries.

•

Funding for WPRS should come from RESEA if Wagner-Peyser funding to WPRS is
insufficient.

•

To provide services to the remainder of non-job-attached UI beneficiaries, the
Employment Security Administration Account should pay for UI work test enforcement,
eligibility reviews, labor exchange services, and reemployment services for all other
beneficiaries.

•

Education and training for the long-term unemployed should be funded from a source
other than the UTF to preserve the integrity of the UI system.

•

Short Time Compensation—work-sharing programs—should operate in all states.

•

Self-Employment Assistance should be available in all states, and these opportunities
could be targeted with state WPRS models.

•

States should have the option to offer reemployment bonuses through UI. Bonuses should
be implemented with a five-year sunset, and federal subsidies provided to states willing
to conduct field experiments evaluating their effectiveness.
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